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Abstract
The paper concerns itself with the struggles that are prompted by the question ‘what is 
my  position  as  a  teacher  who  whilst  wanting  to  pursue  emancipatory  practices 
nevertheless  is  fearful  of  finding  herself  supporting  and  perpetuating  normalizing 
structures?’ An extract drawn from a journal entry serves as a base on which a series 
of reflexive readings are rehearsed. These have spanned over a period of time (2000-
09) and as a consequence convey the theoretical vantage points that have been used in 
order  to  create  conceptual  openings  where  there  are  possibilities  for  thinking 
‘differently’.  Both practices  of deconstruction  (Derrida,  1976) and anthropological 
work on purification rites (Douglas, 1970, Kristeva, 1982) are used to shift the means 
with  which  I  make  sense.  Overall  the  paper  depicts  an  individual’s  attempts  at 
creating a becoming space (Derrida, 1980), where thinking and doing may be a little 
less bounded.  
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What is ‘familiarly known’ is not properly known, just for the reason 
that it is ‘familiar’. When engaged in the process of knowing it is the 
commonest form of self-deception, and a deception of other people 
as well, to assume something to be familiar, and to let it pass on that 
very account…(Hegel, 1967, p. 92).
Introduction
Let me start with an example of data that was collected when undertaking fieldwork 
for my doctorate. Here a central concern was located around the question ‘what is my 
position  as  a  teacher  who  whilst  wanting  to  pursue  emancipatory  practices 
nevertheless  is  fearful  of  finding  herself  supporting  and  perpetuating  normalizing 
structures?’  
(Journal Entry, November 2000)
Outside rain and litter had reduced the play area to a filthy, uninviting and uninspiring 
zone. I asked Emma1, the nursery nurse, to get out the toys whilst I started to pick up 
the rubbish. This triggered a regular discussion with Jane, the teacher of the parallel 
kindergarten class. In brief, her argument is that it is the job of the caretaker to pick 
up litter  and that ‘as teachers we shouldn’t  have to or be expected to pick up the 
litter’.  My reply evolved around several  points:  first,  I  don’t  want  to  either  work 
amongst such conditions nor do I want the children to have to play in them. Second, 
that morning Dave, our caretaker, had had to clear away the glass and board up the 
gaps because during the weekend break fourteen windows had been broken. I feel that 
Dave has to struggle to keep abreast with his work not only because of such incidents  
as the broken windows but also because his working hours have been cut. To me, the 
dismal  conditions  of  the playground,  the smashed windows of  the school  and the 
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alterations to Dave’s working conditions are symptomatic of a political system that 
appears  not  to  care.  Personally,  to  leave  the litter  would be to  condone it  and to 
consider  that  it  was  somehow  acceptable  for  the  children  to  play  alongside  and 
sometimes with such waste. 
This journal e exampleMy aim is to use this data as a basis The paper concerns itself  
with the struggles that are prompted by the question ‘what is my position as a teacher 
who whilst wanting to pursue emancipatory practices nevertheless is fearful of finding 
herself supporting and perpetuating normalizing structures?’ An extract drawn from a 
journal entry serves as a base on which a series of reflexive readings are rehearsed. 
These have spanned over a period of time (2000-09) and as a consequence convey the 
theoretical vantage points that have been used in order to create conceptual openings 
where  there  are  possibilities  for  thinking  ‘differently’.  Both  practices  of 
deconstruction  (Derrida,  1976)  and  anthropological  work  on  purification  rites 
(Douglas, 1970, Kristeva, 1982) are used to shift the means with which I make sense. 
Overall  the  paper  depicts  an  individual’s  attempts  at  creating  a  becoming  space 
(Derrida, 1980), where thinking and doing may be a little less bounded.  
How might we interrupt our customary ways of seeing and perceiving? In what ways 
might  we  materialise  a  reflective  and  communicative  pedagogy  (Dahlberg  et  al, 
1999),  where  there  are  possibilities  to  critique  familiar  convictions  about  young 
children and their social worlds? What is my position as a teacher who whilst wanting 
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to pursue emancipatory practices nevertheless is fearful of finding herself supporting 
and perpetuating normalizing structures? These are questions that have been struggled 
over at various junctures both when undertaking my doctorate and subsequently. In 
this  paper  I  take  an  anecdote  that  was  recorded  in  my  research  journal  -  a 
methodological tool that was greatly favoured when collecting data for the doctorate. 
When  reading  such  data  a  core  ambition  was  to  move  from  common-sense 
understandings  of  what  it  means  to  be a  teacher  to  a problematising  about  and a 
careful  examination  of  the  tangled  complexities  which  lie  between  knowing  and 
doing. Incorporating poststructuralist theories in general but particularly the work of 
Derrida (1980) contributed towards this task.
Since completing the doctorate I have moved out of the kindergarten classroom and 
into a university where one of my roles includes teaching students who are in their 
final year of study for a degree in Early Childhood Studies. In class I try to generate 
thoughtful  conversations  where both students and their  teacher  alike struggle with 
how we understand the young child and her social context. In general, the fixing of 
universal  ‘truths’  and  the  imposition  of  categories  are  practices  that  have  been 
vigorously undertaken within the field of early years. As a consequence there is in 
class  an  imperative  to  be  reflexive  so  that  some  of  the  mechanisms  for  ‘fixing’ 
children including issues around ‘identity’ might be interrogated.
What follows is an attempt at illustrating some of the ground clearing activities that 
have been undertaken where I have tried to challenge my own preferred ways of seeing 
and representing the world (Britzman, 1995; Fine, 1994; Lather, 1993/1995). The 
question of whether reflexivity does or does not produce better research (Patai, 1994) is 
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questionable. But I would argue that by interrogating my own position I am more 
‘vigilant about my practices’ (Spivak, 1984, p. 84) a move that I perceive as a 
necessary precursor to being a ‘better’ teacher.
The paper begins with an example of data that as previously noted was collected whilst 
undertaking doctoral studies. This is then subjected to a Derridean reading. Following 
on further analyses are offered. These have been inspired by my recent and on-going 
encounters with Mary Douglas’ (1970) anthropological work on purification rites and 
Julia Kristeva’s (1982) psychoanalytical approaches to abjection. Such encounters 
unsettle my psychic attachment to a very particular reading of the child where notions 
such as what is ‘best’ or ‘suitable’ in terms of practice are challenged. In the concluding 
remarks I address the relationship between reflexivity and my own practice.   
The data
A Derridean reading
The  work  of  Derrida,  although  deeply  complex  and  highly  challenging,  has 
nevertheless worked at destabilising what Spivak (1980) refers to as ‘mind set’. That 
is, where ingrained habits and assumptions work at legitimating authoritarian fictions:
…a certain  view of  the  world,  of  consciousness,  and of 
language has been accepted as the correct one, and, if the 
minute  particulars  of  that  view  are  examined,  a  rather 
different  picture  emerges.  That  examination  involves  an 
enquiry into the ‘operation’ of our most familiar gestures 
(Spivak in Derrida, 1976, p. xiii).
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Derrida’s  work  centres  on  a  sustained  attack  on  what  he  considers  to  be  the 
authoritarianism of western thought and in particular its commitment to essentialism. 
A vivid example of essentialism in Western thought is the practice or phenomenon 
known  as  ‘logocentricity’:  the  belief  that  words  are  representations  of  meanings 
already  present  in  the  speaker’s  mind  (Sim,  1992,  p.  429).  For  Derrida,  the 
relationship  between  speech  and  transparency  of  meaning  is  the  heritage  of 
logocentrism and phonocentrism which he  explains  as,  ‘the  absolute  proximity of 
voice  and being,  of voice and the meaning of being,  of  voice  and the  ideality  of 
meaning’ (Derrida, 1976, p. 12). He therefore rejects the conception of meaning as a 
fixed entity awaiting representation by either a spoken or written word:
…meaning is neither before nor after the act… the notion 
of an idea or ‘interior design’ as simply anterior to a work 
which  would  supposedly  be  the  expression  of  it,  is  a 
prejudice (Derrida: 1978, p. 11).
Rather than searching within a text for a pre-existence essence or ‘interior’ design 
Derrida calls for:
…the joyous affirmation of the play of the world and the 
innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs 
without  fault,  without  truth,  and  without  origin  that  is 
offered to an active interpretation (Derrdia, 1978, p. 292). 
An active interpretation: 
But pure perception does not exist: we are written only as 
we write,  by the agency within us which always  already 
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keeps  watch  over  perception,  be  it  internal  or  external 
(Derrida, 1978, p. 226).
Staging  ground  clearance:  a  reflexive  exploration  of  our 
own practices of representation (Woolgar, 1988, p. 98).
Deconstruction,  if  such  a  thing  exists,  should  open  up 
(Derrida, 1987, p. 261).
Making  or  producing  an  ‘active  interpretation’  involves  I  think  engaging  with 
practices of deconstruction, where the onus is on me to try to displace the text. Such 
displacements can potentially unsettle the text so that its body – that is the words, the 
ordering  of  the  text,  the  arguments  that  are  used  to  lend  it  authority  -  begin  to 
disentangle. But, as noted, these are strategies of displacement not confrontation. It’s 
an engagement with a text rather than a battle. It’s an effort at locating the binaries in 
order to ‘demystify the realities we create’ (Caputo, 1987, p. 236). It’s work aimed at 
discerning how a text is ‘articulated’. As Maggie MacLure (2003, p. 9) notes, ‘one of 
the most general and commonplace ways in which this articulation is done is through 
the  setting  up of  binary  oppositions’.  A binary opposition  is  where  one side,  the 
positive, draws its strength from its negative ‘other’. MacLure (2003, p. 9) also notes 
how particular words, can invest individuals with a ‘particular identity – heroic or 
villainous’.
Several of the oppositions that feature in the above example are located around the 
appearance  of  the  play  area.  It  has,  for  example  been  ‘reduced’ by  natural 
phenomenon (rain) and by humankind (litter) and made ‘filthy’. To reduce is to ‘make 
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or  become  smaller  in  size,  or  to  bring  into  a  certain  state  or  condition’  (Collins 
Dictionary, 1992). Within the above text, there is then a suggestion that through a mix 
of events including acts of God, which in this instance are construed negatively, and 
unkindly acts of people that the playground has been diminished. In this story, neither 
the god of rain nor the people have produced growth that by implication would be a 
positive  step;  rather  they  have  made  the  ground  filthy.  To  point  to  someone  or 
something  as  filthy  is  to  go  beyond  saying  they  or  it  are  dirty;  there  is  also  an 
inference of viciousness and or obscenity – think here of the filthy trick or the filthy  
rich. Moreover, the playground is a  zone. Shortly afterwards reference is made to a 
triggered discussion.  Zone – particularly in current times - connotes images of war, 
perhaps  a  battlefield  or  a  no-go area.  Whilst  triggered reiterates  the  war  imagery 
because  of  its  embedded  allusion  to  guns.  So,  the  hero  picks  up  paper.  But  will 
anything change? Currently, it would seem that both teachers are locked into habitual 
positions.  They are like two protagonists,  intent  on both occupying and defending 
their ideological territories. One holds fast to an area that could perhaps be described 
as a desire for and a need to articulate the notion of professionalism that is expressed 
in this instance as, ‘… as teachers we shouldn’t have to or be expected to pick up 
litter’. Maybe it is also the case that besides being a positional statement the above 
utterance is also a plea to know. That is, to know what teachers are meant to ‘be’ or 
‘expected’ to do.  The other camp could be described in the following way: this could 
be the territory of the middle class liberal who, because she occupies the moral high 
ground alienates herself and as a result she is found picking up litter on her own. It 
may well be that her intentions and actions stem from a commitment to social justice 
and additionally,  it could be that for her picking up paper is a way of making the 
‘personal political’ but as the situation never changes more creative routes need to be 
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found to  replace  the  mechanistic  and habitual  ways.  Further,  it  could  be  that  her 
marshalled  and  ordinally  presented  arguments  both  maintain  and  police  her 
boundaries and prevent more relaxed exchanges where uncertainties,  ambivalences 
and contradictory views could be expressed more freely. As it is, her cries of ‘it’s not 
good enough’ (for  whom?) have perhaps worked at  muting  and suppressing what 
currently must remain unheard and not-yet-possible. 
Stories, such as the one above can be perceived as ‘enabling stories’ (Bernstein, 1983, 
p. 128) in that they foreground certain conceptual blind spots (Lather, 1993, p. 91). 
These blocks the vision that is necessary for diverse and creative thinking so that 
stagnant and mechanistic ways of being might be interrupted. Let me return to the 
extract. The playground in my view is both ‘uninviting’ and ‘uninspiring’. Common 
sense would indicate/dictate that the combined ingredients of mud and litter would 
work at producing a less than attractive environment. But there is, I believe, more at 
work here than simply common sense. The view that an area can be both inviting and 
inspirational to children clearly rests on theories, which in this instance are theories 
that relate to notions of the child, the teacher and the context in which both operate. 
So,  the  grounds  in  order  to  invite  the  children  must  be  signalling  a  number  of 
messages,  including  presumably  signals  of  welcome  and  or  messages  that  are 
intended to  provoke or  tempt  the  children  into  playing.  Such messages,  however, 
seemed  to be  lost  on or  are  not  being  read  correctly  by those  who are  currently 
contributing  to  the  littering.  So,  as  the  teacher  I  am  investing  in  the  grounds, 
expending energy so that it is clean and thinking about it so that it is inspirational but 
nevertheless failing to make this a shared commitment. Currently it would appear that 
that it is a commitment that is shared with neither colleagues or with the community 
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that the school is there to serve. Is it that this community does not care? Countless 
instances of community dedication to the children tell me that to posit the issue within 
yet another binary of care /not care is fruitless. But what I can do is to question the 
construction of the child that appears to underpin the vision that I hold with regards to 
the play area. There are, I believe, strong hints that I am holding on to notions of the 
child as conceptualised by Rousseau and which were developed further by pioneers of 
early years pedagogy including for example Froebel. He conceptualised schools as 
gardens  where  young  children  could  develop  ‘naturally’.  This  romantic  vision 
stemmed from the belief that because young children were ‘natural’ it followed they 
were inherently ‘good’:
The idea is that ‘evil’ happens to the child from the outside, 
in  the  form  of  unhealthy  environments,  poverty,  bad 
upbringing, and so on. Evil is therefore not natural; it is a 
deviation from the natural state. If man (sic) is inherently 
anything,  then  he  is  inherently  good  (Hultqvist  1998,  p. 
101-5). 
As Dahlberg et al (1999, p. 45) note, ‘psychology has legitimated this construction of 
the young child, especially experts of young children who have placed the child’s 
expression in free play and free creative work at the centre of pedagogical activity’. 
The ‘natural’ child has therefore become ceded to and embedded in the construction 
of the ‘normal’ child. In this instance, however, is this ‘fantasy of the normal child’ 
(cf. Walkerdine,  1990) an image that is being shared by the community? It would 
seem that because I am attached to a particular construction of the child I have then a 
need to create a sanctuary that is safe from outside corruptive influences, including 
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litter, so that the child might develop into perfection.  Such a construction achieves 
two things. First, it ignores the fact that the children are part of the world and not 
separate to it and second it regulates me and it is a form of regulation that contributes 
towards my ‘mind set’.
The next section of the paper draws upon recent encounters with the work of Mary 
Douglas (1970) and Julia Kristeva (1982). Their theories have allowed me to take 
further stock of the data. In particular they have allowed me to consider how my own 
psychic attachments position me in particular ways so that I both operate and police 
boundaries where effectively I am culpable in ‘othering’. 
Mindset and its relationship to a discourse of disgust 
MacLure (2003) notes that in order to understand a text including ones that seek to 
describe the messy state of a playground I need to do two things. First I need to stick 
close to the details  of a particular  text,  ‘worrying away at the word-y fabric out of 
which arguments are woven.’ But secondly analysis is also about a ‘matter of moving 
away from the details of the specific texts – of moving back and forwards through other 
texts,  of  other  times,  to  try  to  glimpse  that  vastly  bigger  fabric  of  intertextual 
associations within which each particular text is suspended’ (MacLure, 2003, p. 23). 
Hopefully  efforts  have  been  materialised  in  order  to  do  the  first  of  MacLure’s 
suggestions. What follows are my efforts to shift to the second phase where I move 
away from the text so as to try to grasp at the intertextual associations in which my 
description lies.
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To describe something is to invite the prospective reader to line up beside oneself so 
as to share or witness what it is that I have found to be of interest. In this instance 
something has been noted because I have deemed it sufficiently odd, out of place, 
different and unsatisfactory. Such judgements have been made from the position of 
being an affluent middleclass white woman. So my marking out activities have been 
made against what in my view constitutes the normal, the conventional, the familiar 
and so on.  Describing in this way is a kind of “Othering”.
The notion of “other” has been of intense interdisciplinary interest  for a sustained 
period of time. For example, the work of Simone de Beauvoir (1972) was located 
around a central thesis where woman is always “Other” to man’s “Absolute”. That is 
man is, ‘the absolute human type…he is both positive and neutral’ (Hekman, 1990, p. 
74). Meanwhile, Lacanian psychoanalysis has directed attention at how subjectivity is 
produced in language where “othering” (inevitably) occurs:
In Lacanian theory the symbolic order is necessarily patriarchal 
since  the  difference  which  makes  meaning  possible  is 
guaranteed by a transcendental signifier, the Phallus (Weedon, 
1999, p. 82). 
Additionally,  Foucault’s  (1972)  analysis  of  discourse  where  the  emphasis  is  on 
‘practices that form the objects of which they speak’ (Foucault,  1972: 49) has had 
significant influence on how I understand “othering”. Within a Foucauldian approach, 
discourses are inextricably linked to social institutions including for example the law, 
church, education and family as well as to the disciplines that both regularize and 
normalize  the  conduct  of  those  who  are  brought  within  the  compass  of  those 
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institutions. As an example a swift backward glance to the 19th century identifies how 
a discourse such as medicine formed the ideological  basis and justifications for a 
range  of  social  policies  towards  a  number  of  groups  –  practices  that  materially 
affected their lives. These groups included women and people of colour. In the case of 
race science was used to legitimate both colonialism and slavery. In brief, African 
people  were  not  only  considered  biologically  suited  to  slavery  additionally  like 
women they were scientifically categorised as irrational and therefore unsuited for the 
task of self-government (Stanton, 1960; Brah, 1996). As Weedon notes:
 …scientific racism and similar work on gender set the terms of the 
debates about difference well  into the twentieth century. Indeed, 
the negative qualities consistently attributed to sexual and racial 
difference from a white, middle class male norm by the institutions 
of science, medicine, philosophy and the law made it very difficult 
to see questions of difference in positive terms (Weedon, 1999, p. 
9).
Judith Butler’s (1993) work follows a similar trajectory in examining the relationship 
between “bodies” and “othering” where there are bodies that “matter” whilst others 
are “abject”. This process of separating out or excluding is a deliberate strategy where 
it is directed to particular kinds of others and is as a consequence hegemonic or, in 
other words, ‘…(it) proclaims the beliefs and indeed, the subjectivity of a dominant 
group as the only true or valid ones, precisely by excluding certain others as beyond 
reason  or  humanity’  (MacLure,  2003,  p.  41).  Gee  (1990)  emphasises  how  these 
practices transcribe into common sense or taken-for-granted notions of ‘the right ways 
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to  think,  feel  and  behave’  (Gee,  1990,  p.  xx).  Through  discursive  power, 
understandings about ‘what counts as normal (and deviant) sorts of human beings, as 
well as what counts as normal (and deviant) relationships between them’ (Gee, 1990, 
p. xi) would be prescribed.
Julia Kristeva’s (1982) treatment of abjection is of particular interest to me because it 
centres very much on defilement and bodily waste. Kristeva’s perception of abjection is 
where one’s  sense of  identity  – or  as  MacLure (2003,  p.  40)  puts  it  ones  ‘proper’ 
subjectivity - is disturbed because familiar systems and ways of ordering are disrupted. 
For Kristeva abjection is disrespectful of rules, borders and positions. It is in Kristeva’s 
terms a ‘demarcating imperative’ called into play by our own need to disconnect the 
uncontaminated  from the  contaminated  in  order  to  safeguard  ‘the  self’s  clean  and 
proper body’ (Kristeva, 1982, p. 68). This line of thinking resonates strongly with the 
anthropological work of Mary Douglas (1970) who examined amongst other things the 
means by which systems including religious laws held in place what was taboo and 
hence how defilement could occur. She notes,
… from all possible materials, a limited selection has been made and 
from all possible relations a limited set has been used. So disorder by 
implication  is  unlimited,  no  pattern  has  been  realised  in  it,  but  its 
potential for patterning is indefinite. This is why, though we seek to 
create order, we do not simply condemn disorder. We recognise that it 
is  destructive  to  existing  patterns;  also  that  it  has  potentiality.  It 
symbolises both danger and power (Douglas, 1966, p. 94). 
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By working off both Kristeva and Douglas theories it is possible for me to see how the 
litter and broken glass encroaches upon and interferes with those symbolic systems that 
I  invoke in  order  to  separate  the  rational  from the  irrational,  the  orderly  from the 
disorderly, the tamed from the lawless and the civilised from the primitive. It is not just 
the sanctity of the play area that has been tampered with - it is also my own means by 
which I impose symbolic order. Kristeva also makes the significant point that whilst 
paternal authority is imposed on us all by language where the master signifier is the 
phallus,  it  is  nevertheless  maternal  authority  that  regulates  the  body  of  the  child 
policing it to ensure that it is ‘proper’. ‘Maternal authority is the trustee of that mapping 
of the self’s clean and proper body’ (Kristeva, 1982, p. 72). The child and her body is 
perceived as ‘a territory having areas, orifices, points and lines, surfaces and hollows, 
where the archaic power of mastery and neglect, of the differentiation of proper-clean 
and  improper-dirty,  possible  and  impossible  is  impressed  and  exerted’  (original 
emphasis).  From  such  theorizing  I  can  see  how  my  anger,  despair  and  obvious 
frustration with the play area necessitated a constant policing so that I could keep at bay 
all that threatened my notions of what it means to be a ‘proper child’. Like Kristeva’s 
mother my vigilant patrolling of the play area, the picking up of litter and the removal 
of detritus are efforts made to keep a specific territory clean – in both a literal  and 
symbolic sense. 
Concluding discussion
So far my efforts have been located around the ambition of trying to share some of the 
perambulations that have been undertaken where I have attempted to open up my own 
mind set so as to think differently – about young people and their social worlds. My 
collisions with Derrida, Douglas and Kristeva have been aimed at making me critically 
conscious  where  my own  position  as  a  white  middle  class  woman  has  had  to  be 
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accounted for (Pillow, 2003). That said whilst I might have gone some way in making 
my own position transparent this still does not render it unproblematic (Spivak, 1988). 
Similarly in terms of practice am I any clearer how I might have been a ‘better’ teacher 
when in the kindergarten? Likewise in my current role as a teacher to students who will  
themselves become early years pedagogues of what help are my own reflexive turns to 
them? I am both conscious of and fearful of practising what Butler (1993) refers to as a 
‘gesture of humility’ (p. 6) where little change occurs because the colonial relationship 
is  still  maintained albeit  slightly modified  by ‘tolerance’  (Britzman,  1995/1999).  In 
some ways these sentiments characterise my subsequent actions when teaching at the 
kindergarten. In my doctorial thesis I wrote the following: 
Actions included trying to find ways whereby the school became part of 
the  community  rather  than  an  adjunct  of  it.  One  small  step  included 
getting the children themselves to clean up the play area. The phenomenon 
of three and four year olds suitably clad in Wellington boots and gloves 
tidying away detritus prompted passer-by’s to stop, talk and report back to 
friends  and  neighbours.  One  parent  complained  but  again  the  ensuing 
conversation became another avenue for action resulting in help to plant 
shrubs.  The  vandalism didn’t  stop  but  there  was  a  shift  from it  being 
simply an individual’s problem (Jones, 1999, p. 84). 
Effectively what seems to be happening here mirrors the victory narrative as found 
embedded  in  and  played  out  within  action  research  initiatives  whereby  the 
practitioner-researcher having first identified the problem is then able to take steps to 
ameliorate it before finally putting in place a solution. This in summary is reflective 
practice  that  is  driven by and embodies  the  liberal  meliorist  sense  of  the  infinite 
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perfectibility – through the application of reason – of humans and their institutions 
(cf.  Gray,  1995).  Thus  during  the  phase  of  writing  the  doctoral  thesis  whilst  my 
incursions into poststructuralist theory was having the effect of putting subjectivity 
under  erasure  (St  Pierre,  2008,  p.  328)  nevertheless  the  urge  to  fall  back  onto 
customary ways  still  persisted.  ‘Top-down’ practices  were clearly favoured where 
young children are picking up rubbish because of my convictions of what is ‘best’ for 
them in terms of a ‘civilised’ play area. In turning to post colonialism I am forced to 
rethink the profound limitations of a consensual and collusive liberal sense of cultural 
community. As Homi Bhabha notes, ‘The time for ‘assimilating’ minorities to holistic 
and organic notions of cultural value has dramatically passed’. (Bhabha, 1993: 193). 
Perhaps however,  there are possibilities within a ‘pedagogy of discomfort’  (Boler, 
1999:  176)  whilst  simultaneously  practising  a  ‘reflexivity  of  discomfort’  (Pillow, 
2003: 192). In the latter there would continue to be a relentless critique of my research 
activities including those ways I represent reality whether that be of a play area or the 
university  classroom.  Here  reflexivity  would  ‘continue  to  challenge  the 
representations we come to while at the same time acknowledging the political need 
to represent and find meaning’ (Pillow, 2003: 193). So ‘uncomfortable reflexivity’ is 
not about better methods where we might represent people more convincingly or more 
realistically.  Rather  it  is  a  matter  of  ‘whether  we can  be  accountable  to  people’s 
struggles for self-representation and self-determination’ (Visweswaran, 1994: 32). 
Similarly,  ‘pedagogy  of  discomfort’  requires  a  constant  and  critical  engagement 
where  values  and  cherished  beliefs  are  subjected  to  critical  thinking.  Deborah 
Britzman succinctly captures some of the embedded difficulties within such a task. 
She notes:
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Simply  telling  students  the  facts  of  oppression  is  insufficient. 
They need opportunities with what Ann Berlack describes as ‘the 
social-psychological  connections  between  experience  and 
consciousness’ (Berlack,  1989, p. 79). Without an inquiry into 
how  significance  is  made  and  broken,  the  perceived  distance 
between academic knowledge and social experiences will remain 
undisturbed  and  students  will  continue  to  have  difficulties 
understanding  how  the  political  becomes  personal  (Britzman, 
2003, p. 211).
So back in the kindergarten what forms of questioning practices could I have engaged 
with that might have resisted sterile binaries including those located around a proper/ 
improper play area? What opportunities could have been created where the children 
themselves could have articulated some of their own beliefs and hopes about playing 
in  general  as well  as  types  of  play environments?  In what  ways  could they have 
become critical  both of there own beliefs  and mine which whilst  not  comfortable 
practice might have opened a chink for voices and views that are usually subjugated? 
Similarly a university classroom that permits pedagogy of discomfort and a reflexivity 
of discomfort might prove highly potent where students and their teacher alike can 
develop  critical  consciousness  where  as  a  consequence  we can  see  the  effects  of 
certain discursive practices where we are predisposed to read the world including the 
young child in particular ways. 
Notes
1. All names that have been used are pseudonyms.
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